R v Riviere and Others [2026] EWHC 1858 (KB)
Murray Hughman acted for Akile Lee-Walton in a rare and significant High Court judgment handed down on 22 July 2026, with Oliver Renton of Crucible appearing as counsel. The case raises important questions about the limits of the Voluntary Bill of Indictment procedure and what it might signal for investigative and prosecutorial standards in an already stretched system. The defence submissions put before Mr Justice Hilliard raised questions that go beyond this case: in a system already under strain, does the availability of a Voluntary Bill reduce the urgency of getting it right first time?
Background: Charges Dismissed, then Resurrected
On 12 July 2024, Her Honour Judge Russell at the Canterbury Crown Court granted applications to dismiss the charge against four of the defendants, including Mr Lee-Walton. The fifth defendant’s application was granted on 19 July 2024. The judge concluded that the evidence, taken at its highest, would not be sufficient for a jury properly to convict. There was no forensic link between the defendants and the scene, no identification evidence, and the descriptions given by the complainants did not match the defendants. All four defendants were discharged. That, it was thought, was the end of the matter. It was not.
A Shambles and an Abject Failure: The Prosecution’s Disclosure Record
Before the dismissal hearing, the case had been troubled by serious and documented prosecution failings. On 5 July 2024, just one week before the dismissal hearing, the case was listed before HHJ Russell to address defence concerns that prosecution disclosure had not been properly considered. Put simply, the prosecution had not responded to repeat defence requests.
HHJ Russell described the situation in stark terms: a shambles and an abject failure by the prosecution to comply with its disclosure obligations. She found that the prosecution had failed to disclose evidence clearly relevant to the forthcoming dismissal applications, with no explanation for the failure, and ordered remedial steps to be taken by 4pm on 8 July 2024.
What had been requested and not provided was telling. As early as 2 April 2024, solicitors for Mr Riviere had written to the CPS asking for telephone downloads and photographs of the soles of the defendants’ shoes, specifically to establish whether glass was embedded in them. The defence for Mr Lee-Walton had also pursued disclosure requests, including raw telephone data to allow for cell site analysis, CCTV evidence, and vehicle examination recordings. Mr Joof’s solicitors were still asking in early July when a laboratory report on shoes could be expected.
The answer, when it came on 12 July 2024, was that the shoes had been sent to the laboratory, but results were not expected for months. Prosecuting counsel acknowledged at the dismissal hearing that he could not realistically ask the court to adjourn for the glass analysis to be pursued and indeed no application to adjourn was made.
The Voluntary Bill of Indictment Application
By 9 August 2024, the prosecution obtained a witness statement from forensic scientist Dr Louissa Marsh, concluding that glass fragments found on Mr Lee-Walton’s shoes matched the broken doors at the address and were of an uncommonly encountered type. Telephone download evidence had also become available for Mr Riviere and Mr Joof. The prosecution contended that this material, taken together with the evidence already before the court, provided a prima facie case.
Rather than accepting the dismissal as final, the prosecution applied for a Voluntary Bill of Indictment — the exceptional procedure under section 2(2)(b) of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 and paragraph 2(6) of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, allowing the High Court to permit fresh proceedings after a dismissal.
The application was not lodged until 19 December 2025 which is over sixteen months after the forensic evidence was received by the prosecution. The matter was referred to Mr Justice Hilliard on 2 February 2026, and a remote hearing was held on 14 July 2026. Judgment was handed down on 22 July 2026.
The Defence Position: A Worrying Precedent
Oliver Renton, instructed by Murray Hughman, advanced robust submissions on behalf of Mr Lee-Walton opposing the application. At the heart of response was a fundamental objection: this was not a situation involving genuinely new evidence that had only come into existence after the dismissal. The evidence relied upon by the prosecution had been capable of being obtained before the dismissal hearing. The Crown had the exhibits from the outset, the shoes were seized on 20 March 2024, the same day as the arrests and, critically the investigating officers had the issue in mind during interview as the defendants were questioned about whether glass fragments would be found on their footwear.
The submission was clear: any failure to obtain and serve the forensic evidence in time was an investigative or case management failure, not the later emergence of genuinely unavailable evidence. The authorisation forms required for forensic examination of the shoes were not submitted correctly until 2 May 2024. The authorisations were not granted until 23 May 2024. The shoes were not taken to the laboratory until 28 June 2024 which was less than three weeks before the dismissal hearing.
The defence submitted that simple investigative failings and delay should not justify the exceptional course of a Voluntary Bill of Indictment. The procedure is, and must remain, exceptional. Granting permission in these circumstances, it was argued, risked setting an unfortunate precedent. The passing of this Judgment feels like yet another blow to defence practice as it again reaffirms a system that continues to favour the Prosecution. Had the prosecution first applied to adjourn the dismissal application and failed, a Voluntary Bill application at a later stage might have been a fairer remedy. Instead, no such application was made: the prosecution pressed ahead without the evidence it needed and lost. To resurrect proceedings through the back door of a Voluntary Bill was an answer to a problem the prosecution had itself created through inadequate case management.
The concern is not abstract. The criminal justice system is already under enormous pressure. It is likley that investigators and prosecutors will read the judgment as showing that there is no real urgency in progressing cases, including forensic submissions, because a Voluntary Bill can later be used to cure delay, the consequences for defendants, complainants, and the system as a whole could be significant. The defence submissions made clear that such a reading of the law would risk opening the floodgates to the re-opening of cases dismissed in similar circumstances.
The High Court’s Decision: Granted and Prosecution Firmly Criticised
Mr Justice Hilliard did not shy away from criticising the prosecution. Mr Justice Hilliard found that the prosecution ought to have come to court at a much earlier stage, with clear and accurate dates for when results of forensic examinations and telephone downloads would be available, with full disclosure of what was held, and with an explanation for the failure to reply to defence correspondence. It was noted that the prosecution failed to pursue the evidence about shoes, glass, and telephones with sufficient urgency, and that there had been no urgency about the Voluntary Bill application either. All the relevant material had been in the prosecution’s hands by September 2024, yet the Voluntary Bill application was not lodged until December 2025.
Nevertheless, having balanced all the competing factors, Mr Justice Hilliard concluded that there was a prima facie case against all five defendants on the totality of the evidence now available. The glass evidence, combined with the telephone download material could support the inference that the defendants had travelled together from London to Kent as part of a group involved in the burglary. He was also satisfied that a fair trial remained possible, the defendants had been arrested soon after the alleged offence and no specific prejudice from the delay was identified. Delay could, if necessary, be addressed at sentencing or in bail decisions.
Weighing all of this, Mr Justice Hilliard determined that it was in the interests of justice to grant the Voluntary Bill “In my judgment, that is a better resolution of the competing interests in the case than declining to grant the Voluntary Bill which would mean that what I am sure would be a fair trial of a serious allegation against a number of people would not happen at all”. The application was accordingly granted in respect of all five defendants.
